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Abstract
The paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to
behave according to the predictions of game theory as observed in two person guessing
game experiments. In this game, each of two people has to choose simultaneously a
number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the
closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero.
Because of the simplicity of the game (once it is understood), the widespread failure
of subjects to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of
some fundamental inability to behave strategically.
The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is
related to how the game is presented. Several different presentations are studied. Some
subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game
is transformed into the simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context,
subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies. Suggestions for better experiment control
are given.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Evidence from the two person guessing game1 (a “beauty contest” game) demonstrates a 
widespread failure of individuals to choose a weakly dominating strategy (Grosskopf and 
Nagel, forthcoming GEB).  The game appears simple once it is understood. Each of two 
people is instructed to simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The chosen 
numbers are revealed and the winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 
2/3 of the average of the two numbers.  The weakly dominant strategy is zero but 
frequently it is not chosen.  The behavior is interpreted as a clear rejection of game 
theory. 
 
The failure of game theory has been attributed to a cognitive bias in which people 
underestimate their own influence on the outcome of a game (GN). Indeed, the authors 
suggest that this underestimation bias, if wide spread, might replace game theory as an 
explanation of over-crowding and congestion (GN).  Our results support a more 
optimistic outlook for game theory.  We demonstrate that the absence of appropriate 
strategic behavior is not so much due to an inability to think or act strategically as it is a 
failure to recognize and understand the game form itself. That is, subjects have an 
incomplete, inaccurate or perhaps absent grasp of the relationships between the choices 
made in the game and the incentives, which we call “game form recognition.”  The paper 
contains two contributions.  First, we advance the idea that a failure of “game form 
recognition” is an explanation of the phenomena.  Secondly, we explore alternative 
instructions and procedures as tools for guiding tests of game theory. 
 
                                                 
♦ Chou: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, McConnell and Plott: Division of 
Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Nagel: Universitat Pomepu Fabra, 
Department of Economics.   The financial support of the Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics 
and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. Nagel acknowledges  the Human Science Frontier 
Program and the hospitality of HSS Caltech.  The authors wish to thank the students in the Caltech 
Experimental Economics class for many helpful comments and discussions. 
1 Guessing games, with n>2, have been studied by many authors (e.g., Nagel 1995, Ho, Camerer Weigelt 
(1998), Bosch et al. ((2002), Weber (2003) etc); for surveys see Nagel (1998), Camerer (2003). The 2 
person game by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) is different in structure to the two person guessing 
game studied here since in their game both players attempt to choose a number closest to p times the 
other’s chosen number. P is different for the two players and also the interval to choose a number from may 
differ. The n>2 game and the last mentioned game are dominant solvable. A so-called level-k model has 
been applied by the above authors to successfully explain the observed behavior (see also Stahl (1996, 
1998), or a one parameter hierarchical model by Camerer et al. (2004). Weakly dominant strategies are 
typically chosen in 10-20%.  
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The paper is divided into four sections.   The first is an overview that explains the nature 
of the results.  The second is a section on the experimental design that lists experiments.  
The third section, which contains the statements of results, is partitioned into two 
subsections.  Subsection A contains the first tests of whether the failure of game theory 
results from a lack of game form recognition.  Subsection B is an analysis of instruction 
and procedural failures.  The loss of experimental control we observe is striking.  This 
presents an opportunity to explore modifications of the instructions and procedures that 
may be appropriate for addressing the failure to recognize the game form.  The final 
section is a discussion of conclusions. 
 
OVERVIEW 
  
The research began with a discussion of a question posed by GN.   What would happen if 
you simply told subjects that the person who chooses the lower number wins?  Such a 
hint falls short of telling them that the weakly dominant strategy is to choose zero but it 
makes the strategic structure clear.  A presumption would be that with such a hint, 
subjects would all behave according to game theoretic predictions.  But, if game theory 
works perfectly when such a hint is provided, it would seem that the failure of game 
theory reported in the literature turned more on subjects’ perception of the nature of the 
exercise than on the psychological bias that was offered as an explanation.  The hint has 
nothing to do with features of the psychological explanation so the power of the hint, if 
such power exists, would be working through some alternative mechanism.  Our 
experiments began with an effort to determine whether the hint has the expected effect.  
 
The initial experiment was designed for the Caltech subject pool. We developed three 
treatments. One treatment had subjects participating with instructions similar to those 
used in the literature. A second treatment added a strong hint: “Notice that the person 
who chooses the lower number always wins.”  A third treatment, which is not discussed 
here, had groups of three choosing in order to test whether groups would be better at 
game theory than individuals.   
 
In the Caltech subject pool, the hint had a definite impact.  Without the hint, dominated 
strategies were frequently chosen, but with the hint, the choice was almost always the 
dominating strategy.  It seemed that our major hypothesis was supported; game form 
recognition and not cognitive biases was operating in GN.  As a test of robustness we 
then went to a completely different subject pool in a local community college. The same 
instructions and procedures were used.  The dramatic result was that the hint made little 
difference in behavior and that with or without the hint subjects tended not choose the 
weakly dominating strategy. 
 
A casual examination of the data leads to the suggestion that we had lost experimental 
control.  Subjects were not playing the game as we constructed it. After the experiment, 
we administered a questionnaire to help us understand why. The data from the 
experiments and the answers to the questionnaire lead to a series of experiments with 
subjects from the local community college, each of which attempted to isolate the source 
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of lost control and to correct it.  Thus, a research design that began as a simple test 
transformed itself into exploratory research.  
 
We first present our major conclusion below.  Our conclusion is that the data from (GN) 
should not be interpreted as a rejection of game theory or as a manifestation of a 
cognitive bias.  Instead, subjects did not understand the game form.  Having presented the 
substantive result of the research, the paper turns to our analysis, including the changes in 
procedures and the results of those changes. We present these details as a comment on 
experimental procedures and the subtle features of attention and perception that are at 
play when one attempts to test game theory.  Procedures that appear as obvious solutions 
do not work and those that do are inconsistent with accepted procedures for conducting 
experiments in economics.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Our exploratory experimental design resulted in a series of instructions and procedures. 
Table 1 lists all experiments.  Two subject pools were used, Caltech and a local 
community college, along with one experiment conducted in Spain, at Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra. The instructions implemented two different descriptions of the underlying 
game.  One is abstract and is called the Beauty Contest Game (BCG) and the other is an 
isomorphic game placed in the context of a battle, called Battle.  The BCG came in two 
forms, one with no “hint” and one with the hint: “Notice how simple this is:  the lower 
choice of the two numbers will always win”.  Four sets of procedures were used, we call 
them the Baseline BCG Protocol, the Simplified Protocol, the Battle Protocol and the 
Battle and Simplified Protocol (this incorporates both the Battle Protocol and the 
Simplified Protocol). Each was developed in response to the observations of experiments 
and follow up questions of subjects.  These will be explained below.  
 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the design, the discussion will proceed in the 
order with which it developed.  The first set of instructions and procedures is designed as 
the Baseline Protocol and were administered in four experiments; one at Caltech, one in 
Spain at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and three at a local community college.  This 
protocol and set of instructions contained neutral language that precisely described the 
exercise.  Within the same experimental session, one group had the instructions with no 
hint while a randomly selected second group had the same instructions with a hint.  These 
instructions are in the Appendix. The first experiments were conducted at Caltech.  The 
other subject pools were used as checks on the robustness of the results from Caltech. 
 
The decisions by subjects in the first experiment at the community college tended to be 
dramatically different from the Caltech and Spanish subject pools and motivated the 
construction of a questionnaire that might help us understand the reason for the 
difference. We returned to the class and administered the questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire is Table 2-A.  In order to illustrate the loss of experimental control, we 
include a selection of responses to the questionnaire as Table 2-B.   It seemed clear to us 
that the instructions were not effective in conveying an understanding of the game.  
Experimental control was lost because almost all subjects were not participating in the 
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experiment that we designed.  The reader can glance over the data in Table 2-B and 
develop an independent judgment about the nature of the answers. 
 
In response to the questionnaire, we developed a set of protocols and instructions called 
the Simplified Protocol.  This set of instructions used the words game, strategy, and other 
language to emphasize that the subjects were participating in a strategic situation.  The 
instructions were shortened.  Bullets were used to emphasize important points so reading 
was minimal.  An example was put on the board.  The experimenters carried and showed 
a large amount of cash and wore Caltech t-shirts to focus the subjects on the task and its 
research nature.  In addition, the instructor of the class introduced the experimenters and 
emphasized that it was for real money and that they should pay attention. 
 
Experiments with instruction under the Simplified Protocol seemed to have little effect 
and the comments on the instruction form suggested that subjects did not understand the 
instructions. 
 
In response to this possibility, we developed the “Battle” Scenario which we call the 
Battle Protocol.  The possible usefulness of a non-abstract content in instructions has 
been recognized in the literature.2  The “Battle” Scenario we employ is a game that is 
isomorphic to the BCG with a hint that is dictated by the idea of facilitating the 
recognition of game form. The instructions are dramatically simplified.   Subjects are told 
that they must decide where to place their troops on a hill.  They have a randomly 
determined opponent in the room who will also make such a choice and that the person 
who places their troops highest will win the battle. The hill is 100 feet high.   
 
Our last modification to instructional protocol consisted of administering the BCG under 
the Simplified Protocol after the administration of the battle game under the Battle 
Protocol.  That is, subjects participated in the Battle Protocol experiment and then later 
participated in the Simplified Protocol experiment. We call this combined protocol the 
Battle and Simplified Protocol.  Our hypothesis was that subjects would be more able to 
recognize the form of the game in the abstract BCG after participating in the isomorphic 
battle game.   
 
                                                 
2 Cooper and Kagel (2003) point toward the psychology literature which suggests that the context of in 
which a game is presented affects behavior.  Cooper and Kagel find that a using a meaningful context to 
present a game facilitates learning across games.  The general importance of instructions and procedures in 
economics experiments is also illustrated in Plott and Zeiler (forthcoming).  
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RESULTS 
 
A. Cognitive Bias and Game Theory Rejection vs Game Form Recognition and 
Experimental Control 
 
We use three different measures of subjects’ behavior in the game.  The first is the 
number of subjects who chose the weakly dominant strategy.3  Because we are concerned 
that subjects might not have understood that they can chose 0 and in order to include  
considerations of closeness to equilibrium in our analysis, we include the share of 
students choosing a number less than or equal to 5 as an approximation of the weakly 
dominant strategy.  While we report both measures in the tables, the numbers discussed 
here refer to this approximation of the weakly dominant strategy.  Another measure is the 
average number chosen.  This measure allows for an examination of whether subjects’ 
recognition of the game form (from one set of instructions to another by different 
subjects) goes in gradual steps or whether subjects make a discontinuous jump to a 
different mode of behavior.  If subjects’ behavior represents discontinuous “Eureka” 
moments of recognition of the weakly dominant strategy, we would expect some sort of 
jump and not expect average choices in the BCG to mirror the number of subjects 
choosing the weakly dominant strategy.   
 
Result 1: Departures from the predictions of game theory in the 2-person beauty 
contest game are due to loss of experimental control and lack of game form 
recognition rather than cognitive bias.   
 
This conclusion is initially supported in Table 4 by comparing the results from Caltech 
subjects who received a hint to Caltech subjects who receive no hint .  In the baseline 
treatment, 50%4 of subjects choose the weakly dominant strategy.  When including the 
hint, close to 90% of the subjects chose the weakly dominant strategy. This evidence 
provides strong support that subjects’ behavior is not consistent with a cognitive bias, but 
instead that they do not recognize the game form.  Once they are provided with the 
clarifying hint, they chose the weakly dominant strategy.   
 
While there is a clear loss of experimental control with the community college subjects, 
the results of the exploratory research strongly support the hypothesis that their behavior 
was due to a lack of game form recognition.  Without the hint, none of the subjects 
choose the weakly dominant strategy.  When we consider the approximate measure, 15% 
of subjects chose a weakly dominant strategy.  In addition, introducing the clarifying hint 
makes no difference on subjects’ behavior: with the hint only 7% of subjects chose 
exactly the weakly dominant strategy while 13% chose close to the weakly dominant 
strategy.   
                                                 
3 Subjects’ choices in the battle game are converted by subtracting them from 100 so that they may be 
compared with subjects’ choices in the beauty contest game.   
4 Note that GN report that their students subject choose 0 in 10% while the economic professors choose in 
37%.   Thus, the GN experiments are consistent with what we report.   The performance of subjects who 
might be expected to have greater skills at reading and interpreting instructions is closer to the predictions 
of game theory.  
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Strikingly, when the instructions were given in the form of an isomorphic battle, the 
instance of strategic behavior went up to 65%.  These changes in instructions and 
procedures involved no changes in incentives, information or subject pool.  The only 
feature seems to be the clarity of the game and related incentives.  The result is that 
strategic behavior as predicted by game theory emerged as the fundamental tendency.  
Had subjects been incapable of strategic thinking along the lines of game theory, such 
clarification of rules and incentives should have had no effect. 
  
B. An Anatomy of Loss of Experimental Control and Attempted Corrections  
 
The answers to the questionnaire designed to uncover the reasons for loss of experimental 
control among the community college subjects suggested that the behavior reflected 
aspects of design and execution of the experiment rather than cognitive incapacity or 
preferences.  We therefore undertook exploratory research with these subjects to attempt 
to develop some tools to address loss of experimental control and problems of game form 
recognition.   
 
Result 2: Obvious adjustments to instructions do not show a significant 
improvement in facilitating subjects’ game form recognition.   
 
The Simplified protocol represents a comprehensive effort to simplify instructions and 
improve the conditions under which the game is implemented.  As can be seen in Table 5, 
these changes have little effect on game form recognition, except where the clarifying 
hint is also included.  With no hint, subjects choose the weakly dominant strategy only 
5% of the time.  When they received a hint, subjects chose the weakly dominant strategy 
11% of the time and close to the weakly dominant strategy 32% of the time.5   
 
These results suggest that the changes to instructions may have been able to address more 
fundamental problems of loss of experimental control, such as subjects’ lack of 
engagement with the experiment.  Since the hint offers non-trivial assistance in 
discovering the weakly dominant strategy, we take the lack of response to the hint in the 
Baseline Protocol with subjects’ comments as evidence that subjects were not engaged 
with the experiment.  The simplification of instructions clearly addressed these issues, as 
we see a statistically significant difference in behavior when comparing the hint and no 
hints under the Simplified Protocol, suggesting that subjects were paying attention to 
their instructions.6  However, this also suggests that we did not address the central 
problems of game form recognition.  If the instructional changes were sufficient to 
facilitate recognition of the game form, the subjects would not need an additional hint in 
order to recognize the weakly dominant strategy.   
 
Result 3: Modifying the instructions to present an isomorphic game applied to an 
easily understandable setting provides significant improvements in game form 
recognition.   
                                                 
5 The difference in means is not significant at conventional levels using a t-test of means.   
6 The difference in means is significant at the 5% level using a t-test of means.   
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As discussed above, subjects’ behavior in the isomorphic battle game demonstrates that 
subjects are able to recognize the game form when presented in a familiar context.  The 
results from the Battle protocol can be seen in Table 5.  Subjects chose the weakly 
dominant strategy 46% of the time and close to the weakly dominant strategy 65% of the 
time. 
   The behavior of the community college subjects in this game closely mirrors the 
behavior of Caltech subjects in the original instructional protocol with no hint; the 
average behavior of Caltech subjects is not statistically different from the community 
college subjects in the battle game scenario (Caltech subjects chose the weakly dominant 
strategy 46% of the time and approximated the WD strategy 50% of the time when they 
received no hint).   
 
 Observation: The isomorphic non-abstract instructional procedures generate new 
biases.   
 
Even in the battle game, the proposed controls were not completely successful.  The 
battle game introduced other sources of biases once subjects fixed their attention on a 
specific task.  Examples of comments that illustrate potential dangers of this practical 
application of instructions are illustrated in Table 2.   
 
Result 3: Applying the BCG instructions after the presentation of the isomorphic 
non-abstract game does not provide large improvements in experimental control.   
 
Participation in the battle game prior to the BCG has some affect on performance in the 
beauty contest game, particularly for those do not receive a hint.  The results from the 
Battle and Simplified Protocol can be seen in Table 5.   With no hint, 22% of subjects 
approximate a weakly dominant strategy, whereas without the prior administration of the 
battle game, only 5% of subjects come close to equilibrium behavior.  The difference is 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  With the hint, 41% of subjects chose a strategy 
that approximates a weakly dominant strategy, compared to 32% when there is no prior 
administration of the battle game.7   
 
This suggests that the prior administration of the battle game may have a weak effect on 
the facilitation of game recognition.  However, the difference between behavior with and 
without the hint under the Battle and Simplified Protocol is statistically significant at the 
10% level, indicating that the hint continues to have an impact on subjects’ behavior.  
The success of the hint, even under this protocol suggests that substantial problems of 
game form recognition persist.   
 
Result 4: Subjects do not move gradually in the direction of equilibrium 
behavior.   
 
While we do see significant improvements when the game is administered in a less-
abstract context in the Battle Protocol and for subjects who receive a hint in both the 
                                                 
7 This difference is not statistically significant.   
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Simplified Protocol and the Battle and Simplified Protocol, these changes are not due to 
subjects choosing lower numbers on average. In fact, the instructional changes have very 
little impact on the average number chosen by subjects.  This suggests that subjects do 
not gradually converge toward equilibrium.  Instead, they either perceive the game form 
correctly or do not.  This can also be seen by examining Figure 1 which shows the 
distribution of choices in each of the experimental Protocols.    
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
When doing game theoretic experiments, it is tempting to interpret failures of game 
theory to some alternative theory that rests on a presumption about broad and 
fundamental incapacities of humans to behave strategically.  While this alternative theory 
is not precisely specified, the implication is that humans rely on instincts that are biased 
and are sufficiently powerful to override any tendency towards game theoretic 
predictions.  Our results suggest that the concept of game form recognition is an 
intermediate step between game theory and a general theory of cognitive bias and that 
this intermediate step can be usefully applied as a bridge.   What might appear as a lack 
of subject rationality becomes a failure by the experimenter to implement appropriate 
controls.  Because the concept of game form recognition creates a focus on rather specific 
features of subject understanding in relation to their environment, it gives some direction 
to questions concerning controls.    
 
Our study began with the study of a seemingly simple two person “guessing game” (the 
“beauty contest”) with a weakly dominant strategy.  Behavior of the game as reported in 
the literature suggested a resounding rejection of game theory and our motivation was to 
investigate the replicability and robustness of the result.  The results as reported in the 
literature clearly replicate but are not robust to changes in the instructions.  The result 
reported here is that rejection of game theory can, in the case of the two person “guessing 
game,” be attributed to a failure of subjects to recognize the game form.  The problem is 
more than just a misspecification of the game form, such as playing an imagined game 
that is structurally different than the game intended by the experimenter. In some cases, 
the problem extends to a lack of recognition by the subject that a game is involved, or 
even a complete failure of the subject to pay attention to the instructions.  Instructions 
that appear very simple to an experimenter need not be transparent to the subject.  The 
consequent lack of experimental control can lead to a scientific lack of understanding of 
the actual experiment that was conducted and incorrect inferences from the data.  
 
The results have implications for experimental methodology.  The problem as identified 
here, resides with instructions and procedures so those are the areas on which any 
corrective adjustments should focus.  However, our experience suggests that it is easier 
said than done.  While appropriate corrections will depend on details of the experiment, 
we are able to provide some tentative generalizations.  Post experiment questionnaires 
can be useful tools in helping the experimenter understand the subjects’ problems. 
Clarifying instructions do help but there is no guarantee that it is enough to facilitate the 
recognition of the game form.  Simplification of instructions can help but it might depend 
substantially on the characteristics of the individual subjects. Similarly, making the game 
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less abstract helps with game form recognition, but it may introduce independent dangers 
of loss of control. In that respect, it might be important to inform the subject that the less 
abstract features are included to help with the understanding and should not be taken 
literally. 8
 
                                                 
8 The paper by Cohen, Plott and Levine (1978) in which subjects were given humorous descriptions of 
variables resulted in incomprehensible results until subjects were told that the descriptions were there for 
subject enjoyment and had nothing to do with the underlying task.  The problem was discovered through an 
after-experiment questionnaire in which subjects explained choices as their attempt to change the game to 
one that they thought made more sense given the descriptions of the variables. 
9 
REFERENCES 
 
Bosch D., A., J. G. Montalvo, R. Nagel, and A. Satorra. 2000. “One, Two, (Three), 
Infinity, ...: Newspaper and Lab Beauty Contest  Games”, American Economic 
Review, 92: 1687 -1701. 
Camerer, Colin F. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. 
Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press; New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Camerer, C., T. Ho, and J. Chong. 2004.  “A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Behavior in 
Games”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3): 861-98. 
Cohen, L., C. R. Plott and M. E. Levine 2001. “Communication and Agenda Influence:  
The Chocolate Pizza Design” Reprinted in Charles R. Plott (ed.), Public 
Economics, Political Processes and Policy Applications: Collected Papers on the 
Experimental Foundations of Economics and Political Science, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK. 
Cooper, D. J., J. H. Kagel. 2003.  “Lessons Learned: Generalizing Learning Across 
Games”, The American Economic Review, 93(2): 202-207 
Costa-Gomes M. and Vincent P. Crawford. 2006. "Cognition and Behavior in Two-
Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study”, American Economic Review 
96:1737-1768.  
Grosskopf, B. and R. Nagel.  (2007) “The Two-Person Beauty Contest”, Games and 
Economic Behavior (forthcoming) 
Ho, T., Camerer, C. and K. Weigelt. 1998.  “Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best 
Response in Experimental Beauty Contests”, American Economic Review, 
88:947-969. 
Nagel, R. 1995. “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study”, American 
Economic Review, 85:1313-1326. 
Nagel, R. 1998. “A Survey on Experimental “Beauty-Contest Games: Bounded 
Rationality and Learning,” in Games and Human Behavior, Essays in Honor of 
Amnon Rapoport. Eds. D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R.Zwick. Publisher: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc., New Jersey,105-142. 
Plott, Charles R. and Kathryn Zeiler, forthcoming, “ Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly 
Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?” 
American Economic Review. 
Stahl, D. O. 1996. “Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game”, Games and 
Economic Behavior, 16:303.330.  
10 
Stahl, D. O. (1998):   “Is step j thinking an arbitrary modeling restriction or a fact of 
human nature?”  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37:33-51. 
Weber, R. A. (2003), “Learning with no feedback in a competitive guessing game”,  
Games and Economic Behavior, 44:134-144. 
 
11 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1:  Experiments and Experimental Design 
Date Location Game Protocol No Hint Hint  Total Subjects 
11/16/2006 Caltech BCG Baseline 4 6 22 
11/27/2006 Caltech BCG Baseline 9 9 51 
1/19/2007 Caltech BCG Baseline 7 4 26 
1/23/2007 Caltech BCG Baseline 6 5 26 
U. P F. BCG Baseline 6 7 34 1/25/2007 
2/06/2007-A* C.College BCG Baseline 9 6 27 
2/06/2007-B* C.College BCG Baseline 6 5 26 
2/06/2007-C* C.College BCG Baseline 5 4 24 
3/01/2007-A C.College BCG Simplified 6 6 27 
3/01/2007-B C.College BCG Simplified 5 5 28 
3/01/2007-C C.College BCG Simplified 5 4 24 
3/21/2007-A** C.College Battle Battle 15 15 30 
3/21/2007-B*** C.College Battle Battle 12 13 25 
4/02/2007-A** C.College BCG Simplified 5 4 24 
4/02/2007-B*** C.College BCG Simplified 5 4 21 
C.College BCG & Battle 
Battle and 
Simplified  14 11 
25 
4/05/2007-A 
C.College BCG & Battle 
Battle and 
Simplified 12 12 
24 
4/05/2007-B 
C.College BCG & Battle 
Battle and 
Simplified 13 12 
25 
4/6/2007 
* The questionnaire was administered to these subjects.  In the battle experiments, 
subjects were asked to jot down a brief explanation of their choice on the back of the 
instructions. 
** These two experiments were conducted in the same class.  During the first visitation 
on 3/21/2007, the battle experiment was conducted and on the second visitation on 
4/02/2007, the BCG was conducted. 
*** These two experiments were conducted in the same class. During the first visit on 
3/21/2007-B, the battle experiment was conducted and during the second visit on 
4/02/2007-B, the BCG was conducted.   
Subject totals also include those subjects who participated in a group treatment.  The 
results are not included in this analysis.  
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Table 2A. Questionnaire Administered after experiment 
Questionnaire 
 
Thanks for your help 
 
We are puzzled about some of the responses to our exercise yesterday.  There seemed to 
be many misconceptions and we would like to find out what they were.     
 
1. Did you misunderstand the situation?  What were you thinking?   
2. What about the instructions mislead you?  What can we do to avoid it? 
 
3. Here are some of our guesses about the nature of the problem.  Circle any 
that apply to you.   
(i) I did not really read the instructions. 
(ii) I did not know that there was a competition. 
(iv) I did not understand how a winner would be chosen. 
(v) I did not realize that real money would change hands. 
 
4. Please give us any additional comments that you think might help us.   
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Table 2B:  Illustrations of Loss of Experimental Control: Comments taken from 
Questionnaire 
 
General lack of attention 
I was kind of lost.  I was not thinking. 
I didn’t really understand what was going on.  The ending instructions were confusing. 
I did not read. 
I am stupid. Avoid using stupid people like me. 
I misread the instructions. 
I understood it was a game but I was trying to figure out what the directions mean since I   
      am not very good at math 
I didn’t think too much. The 2/3 thing [was confusing] 
I didn’t read the instructions.  Maybe [you should] write bigger font and bold. 
I wasn’t really paying attention. I didn't understand the how winning number thing 
I just picked randomly.  I did not read the instructions. 
I knew the question is a math competition. 
 
Failure to recognize that own reward depended on choice of others – not a game 
52: sum of cell phone numbers 
I chose 14 cause its my birthday. 
favorite number 
 
Failure to understand how winner is determined 
I was thinking 2/3 of 100 
try and get a close number to the average so that my competitor will have a lower 
number. 
50: since we want the most average number in this game, I picked the perfect average 
Because (50+100)/2=75 
The lowest # wins.  If you choose "0" it won' t have an effect on the other # so I choose 1 
because it is the lowest # 
the how 2/3 thing was unclear 
I did not understand the 2/3 thing 
I do not know how to get 2/3 of the average. 
 
Incentives failure 
don’t want to win 
I was thinking of homework and food. 
 
Imposing own environment in the battle context 
50: middle increases mobility 
99: b/c if I get to win this battle, I have 1 ft to put my flag 
not the highest so it's not that easy to spot.   
0: no oxygen at the peak of the hill 
50: can both attack and defend from my opponent 
50: high enough to win the battle but the troop won’t get tired on the way to the top 
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Table 3: List of Instruction and Procedural Changes 
 
Baseline Protocol (no hint and hint identical except for hint) 
 Neutral and general language was used. 
 
Simplified Protocol (suggestive and simple) 
Instructions: 
Header was added with a Caltech seal. 
Language was changed to use words like “game”, “opponent” and “strategy”. 
Language was simplified and bullet form of instructions used rather than paragraph. 
The ratio was changed from 2/3 to 3/4. 
The hint was accompanied by a figure. 
Protocol: 
Experimenters were introduced by instructor who emphasized importance of exercise. 
Experimenters wore Caltech t-shirts to emphasize that it was research. 
Experiments exposed a large fist full of money. 
 
Battle Protocol (imaginary battle context) 
Instructions: 
Subjects told that their choices were not examined individually and to think strategically. 
The strategic setting was isomorphic to Instruction set B except they were to choose 
where to place their troops on a hill [0,100] and the winner between subject and opponent 
is the one who choose the higher location.  
Protocol: 
Exactly like Streamline BCG Protocol. 
 
Simplified and Battle Protocol (Battle experiment followed by BCG) 
Instructions:  
The two sets of instructions were the same as in C and in B. 
Protocol: 
The protocol was the same as in the Battle Protocol and in the Streamlined Protocol.  
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Table 4: All Subjects: Baseline Protocol 
Measure CIT CIT-Hint PCC PCC-Hint PCC-Battle 
Share: chose 0 0.46 0.87 0 0.07 0.46 
Share: Chose < =5 0.50 0.87 0.15 0.13 0.65 
Average # Chosen 23 3 35 31 15 
N 26 23 20 15 105 
 
Table 5: PCC Subjects 
Measure Baseline 
Protocol: 
No Hint 
Baseline 
Protocol: 
Hint 
Simplified 
Protocol : 
No Hint 
Simplified 
Protocol : 
Hint 
Battle 
Protocol 
Battle and 
Simplified 
Protocol: 
No Hint* 
Battle and 
Simplified 
Protocol: 
Hint* 
Share: chose 0 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.46 0.16 0.26 
Share: Chose < =5 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.32 0.65 0.22 0.41 
Average # Chosen 35 31 25 24 15 31 25 
N 20 15 20 19 105 45 39 
* here we report only the simplified data, without the battle data.  
 
In Tables 4 and 5, data from the subjects who participated as part of a three person group is excluded.  
FIGURE 1: Cumulative frequencies of the different treatments with PCC subjects 
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APPENDIX A. 
 
BASELINE PROTOCOL – HINT  
 
Your job as a group is to choose a single number between 0 and 100, both included. 
Your group must choose only ONE number and it need not be an integer.  The number 
you choose will be compared to the number chosen by the group with which you are 
matched.  The winner of the prize is the group whose number is closest to 2/3 times the 
average of the two numbers.  That is, your number and the number of the other group 
are added and divided by two.  The winner of the prize is the group whose number is 
closest to 2/3 of this average. The losing group gets nothing. 
 
The prize is $8 per person ($4 per person if there is a tie). That is, each member of the 
winning group receives $8.  If there is a tie, all members of both groups receive $4.  
 
You have at most 5 minutes to decide on a single number which you should enter in the 
blank below.     
 
number Notice how simple this is:  the lower number will always win  
(see Figure) 
 
 average of two numbers 
 
2/3 average of two numbers  
 
 
lower number  
 
 
NUMBER CHOSEN __________________(please enter one number here) 
 Group ID ____________________________ 
My Name ____________________________ 
 
Please write down your motives for choosing your number on the back of the 
instructions.   
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BASELINE PROTOCOL - NO HINT 
 
Your job as a group is to choose a single number between 0 and 100, both included. 
Your group must choose only ONE number and it need not be an integer.  The number 
you choose will be compared to the number chosen by the group with which you are 
matched.  The winner of the prize is the group whose number is closest to 2/3 times the 
average of the two numbers.  That is, your number and the number of the other group 
are added and divided by two.  The winner of the prize is the group whose number is 
closest to 2/3 of this average. The losing group gets nothing. 
 
The prize is $8 per person ($4 per person if there is a tie). That is, each member of the 
winning group receives $8.  If there is a tie, all members of both groups receive $4.  
 
You have at most 5 minutes to decide on a single number which you should enter in the 
blank below.     
 
 
NUMBER CHOSEN ________________(please enter one number here)  
Group ID ____________________________ 
My Name ____________________________ 
 
Please write down your motives for choosing your number on the back of the 
instructions.   
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 SIMPLIFIED PROTOCOL – HINT  
 
C A L I F O R N I A       I N S T I T U T E      O F       T E C H N O L O G Y 
 
Instruction to the Game: 
 
1. Strategically choose a number between 0 and 100, both included.  
 
2. You will be randomly assigned an opponent from the room.   
 
3. We will calculate 3/4 of the average of your number and your 
opponent’s number 
 
Winning Rule: 
  
 Your number will win if it is closer to (3/4 of the average of the your number and 
your opponent’s number) 
 
 If your number wins we will pay you $8 at the end of class today.  If you choose the 
same number as your opponent, you will receive $4.   
 
Notice how simple this is:  the lower number will always win  
(see Figure) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You have five minutes to think about your answer.  Write your number in the space 
below. 
Number 
3/4 of average 
Average  
Lower number 
 
NUMBER CHOSEN __________________ (please enter one number here) 
Group ID ____________________________ 
My Name ____________________________ 
 
Please write down your motives for choosing your number on the back of the 
instructions.   
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SIMPLIFIED PROTOCOL– NO HINT 
 
 
 
C A L I F O R N I A       I N S T I T U T E      O F       T E C H N O L O G Y 
 
 
 
 
Instruction to the Game: 
 
1. Strategically choose a number between 0 and 100, both included.  
 
2. You will be randomly assigned an opponent from the room.   
 
3. We will calculate 3/4 of the average of your number and your opponent’s number 
 
Winning Rule: 
  
 Your number will win if it is closer to (3/4 of the average of the your number and 
your opponent’s number) 
 
 If your number wins we will pay you $8 at the end of class today.  If you choose the 
same number as your opponent, you will receive $4.   
 
 
You have five minutes to think about your answer.  Write your number in the space below. 
 
NUMBER CHOSEN ________________ (please enter one number here)  
 
Group ID ____________________________ 
  
My Name ____________________________ 
 
 
Please write down your motives for choosing your number on the back of the 
instructions.   
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BATTLE PROTOCOL 
 
C A L I F O R N I A       I N S T I T U T E      O F       T E C H N O L O G Y 
 
 
You have been chosen to play a simple strategic game.  This 
game is a small part of a larger project, so your performance will 
not be scrutinized or manipulated.  Please think strategically 
about the scenario below.   
 
 Setting of the Game: 
 
 Imagine yourself at war facing an opponent in a battle on a hill 
 
 Both you are your opponent (a random person from this room) must locate 
yourselves on the hill 
 
 The hill is 100 feet high 
 
Instruction to the Game: 
 
 Your job is to choose how high to locate your troop on the hill, from 0 feet high 
to 100 feet high (both heights included).   
 
 You win the battle if your chosen location is higher than your opponent’s. 
 
Winning Rule: 
 
 If your location is higher than your opponent’s, you will win $8 cash at the end 
of class today.  If you choose the same location as your opponent, you will 
receive $4.   
  
You have five minutes to think about your answer.  Write your location in the 
space below. 
 
LOCATION CHOSEN __________________(please enter one number here) 
Group ID ____________________________ 
My Name & ID Number____________________________ 
 
Please write down your motives for choosing your number on the back of the 
instructions.   
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